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Abstract
The basic thesis of this article is that with his book on legal revolution Brunkhorst rewrites a
dialectic of enlightenment. According to Brunkhorst, learning processes, which lead to the rev-
olutionary institutionalization of a new constitutional order, are triggered by negativity. This begs
the following questions. What is the account of the belief in a concurrency of dialectics of
enlightenment and the learning process? Why do extreme forms of exploitation and oppression
still lead to the learning process?
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I shall make an attempt to present – at least in my view – three salient points of Hauke
Brunkhorst’s Critical Theory of Legal Revolutions. Following each point I will pose a
question. Throughout his book Brunkhorst returns to the idea of a dialectic of enlighten-
ment. Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment ‘is a book on revolution’
(Brunkhorst, 2014: 463). My basic thesis which actually derives from a rather sympa-
thetic reading is that with his book on legal revolution Brunkhorst rewrites a dialectic
of enlightenment. My first and second questions both concern his idea of negativity.
Brunkhorst’s starting point is the distinction between two types of evolutionary
change: an adaptation of the social system to its environment is distinguished from a
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revolutionary change that leads to normative constraints, particular legal constraints of
constitutional law. Hauke opposes the common view that economics, legislation and pol-
itics are able to change only incrementally and cumulatively, a ‘revolution’ or major shift
in their outlook appears impossible. However, he elucidates the framework of revolu-
tionary change by reconstructing the underlying set of learning processes.
A crisis of legitimization is the trigger of (progressive or regressive) normative learning pro-
cesses of the respective society as a whole. In the extreme case a crisis of legitimization can
cause revolutionary change. The great legal and constitutional revolutions therefore are the
paradigmatic cases of collective learning that is normative. They are not the result of gra-
dual and incremental change that leads to the improvement and growth of the adaptive
capacity of the society, but of rapid, catalytic or revolutionary change that leads to a new
constitutional order. The constitutional order is path-disclosing and path-directing because
it constrains social selection normatively. (Brunkhorst, 2014: 59)
The major feature that distinguishes revolution from adaptation is the capacity to create a
normative perspective in a learning process. Whereas the adaptive capacities are
restricted to a blind and uncontrollable process that is external to our normative perspec-
tive, revolutionary change is a normative issue that is internal to our perspective. An
adaptation type of evolution is committed to an economic, political, or legal concept that
lacks any capacity to critically observe its own foundations. These would require further
epistemological and sociological arguments that are usually located outside of econom-
ics, legislation and politics itself. In contrast, revolutionary change is inextricably linked
with a normative perspective to learn from crisis. It is crucial for Brunkhorst’s approach
that the emancipatory power – what he calls ‘the abstract emancipatory potential of com-
municative use of symbolic gestures’ – is inherent in social performances. ‘Evolution is a
transcendental fact that is constitutive for reflexive knowledge of the evolution that is
itself part of evolution’ (Brunkhorst, 2014: 11).
This reflexive knowledge is described as follows:
Now on the contrary, the emancipatory power of the negative that presumably is inherent in
social performances can be recognized and used as a concept of emancipation only from the
retrospective point of view. Only from a much later perspective we can invent this power as
a concrete category of emancipation that is the basis of our ‘uncompleted project’ of ‘human
emancipation’. The former’s historical existence as an evolutionary universal depends com-
pletely on the later revolutionary invention and its becoming universal. From our perspec-
tive one can recognize easily that the abstract emancipatory potential of communicative use
of symbolic gestures is a necessary precondition and implication of the concrete idea of ega-
litarian and universal mass-democracy. The point is that the normative idea of an unfinished
project of modernity is nothing external to society but completely internal to it. First it is an
internal concept as an empirical theory of society that operates within the society as a com-
municative endeavour, and second, it does so on the ground of the general assumption that
the people themselves in their own communicative actions are oriented to such a project
because they are themselves constrained normatively by certain standards of rational com-
munication. Revolutionary transformations are retrospectively inventing evolutionary
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universals that are normative. One of these evolutionary universals is the idea of cosmopo-
litan statehood. (Brunkhorst, 2014: 335)
This learning process is, in Brunkhorst’s words, triggered by negativity. Crisis and class
struggles are – he terms it – ‘the power engine’ of normative and moral learning pro-
cesses which sometimes lead to the revolutionary institutionalization of a new constitu-
tional order. Here, evolution takes the shape of a learning process that manifests the
increasing capacity of a society to solve normative conflicts in mutual and rational
agreement.
The take-off of the social evolution only can be explained by the exponential growth of
communicative negations: contradiction, disagreement and dissent. In the beginning the
growth of communicative negativity effectively could be repressed by segmented egalitar-
ian societies. Yet, it is unleashed by the ideological and in particular religious reflexions of
the cureless social relations of injustice, exploitation and oppression that are inherent to
imperial and stratified societies during the Axe Age. (Brunkhorst, 2014: 56)
Now, the learning process is accompanied by an increasing risk of regression, devolution
and moral catastrophes. This tendency of risk is described by Brunkhorst as a kind of
dialectics of enlightenment. The revolution abolishes all class domination, but in – as
he calls it – ‘a backstroke’ (2014: 76) it establishes new and even more stable formations
of class domination. Here Brunkhorst quotes from Theunissen what is one of the mottoes
of the book: ‘Negativity is the price for the emancipation from the illusion of an
unchangeable world’ (ibid.:: 337). He reconstructs the sequence of great revolutionary
transformations as a kind of progress in the consciousness of freedom that could be spec-
ified as progress in the universalization, individualization, pluralization and realization
of freedom. This progress of emancipation generates, and here the dialectic of enlight-
enment comes into play, ever new formations of oppression, domination and class rule.
Both progress and regression go together. There remains a dialectical tension between
progress of existing freedom and justice and all forms of exploitation, injustice and sup-
pression. Establishing a new idea of freedom, the transformation turns into its opposite, a
new form of domination. Hence, the concept of dialectics is twofold. On the one side,
negativity triggers collective learning processes. It emancipates the reflexive capacity
to overcome crisis. On the other side, negativity leads to a higher risk of moral cata-
strophe in case of failure at crisis-solving. This seems to entails following consequence:
negativity triggers learning processes and likewise the potential of higher catastrophes.
Since negativity triggers learning processes, it seems that even a higher catastrophe itself
triggers learning processes.
The issue of negativity prompts two questions. First, it strikes me that negativity cuts
both ways. The Janus-faced capacity of negativity to exacerbate and to overcome crisis is
quite similar to what has been described by Adorno and Theunissen as the myth of Tele-
phus: trosas iasetai: ‘he that wounded shall heal’, ‘Der Speer, der die Wunde schla¨gt,
heilt sie auch’. This is similar to the phrase in Ho¨lderlin’s Patmos hymn: ‘Wo aber
Gefahr ist, wa¨chst / Das Rettende auch’ [But where there is danger, / A rescuing element
grows as well]. The claim that negativity is such a mysterious ‘power engine’ begs the
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following question. What is the account of this dialectic, namely the belief in a concur-
rency of dialectics of enlightenment and learning process? Why do extreme forms of
exploitation and oppression still lead to the learning process? Either one says that evolu-
tion decreases the risk of moral catastrophe or one says in terms of the dialectic of
enlightenment that evolution simultaneously increases the risk of moral catastrophe. But
the latter begs the question of the specific conditions for a revolutionary process in the
light of extreme forms of exploitation and oppression. Hence, the emancipation of learn-
ing processes and the dialectic of enlightenment pull in different directions. There is no
straightforward way to adjudicate the conflict by reference to an overarching telos of his-
tory. But how could this tension otherwise be resolved?
Here is my second question. Brunkhorst’s analysis of negativity begs the question
whether it can accommodate a concept of alienation. He describes negativity as the expe-
rience of injustice, disrespect, humiliation and suffering caused by domination. Theunis-
sen, to whom he appeals, additionally describes negativity in terms of alienation.
Alienation consists in a sort of indifference [Gleichgu¨ltigkeit] and prevents negativity
from being experienced as such (Theunissen, 1980: 359–63). Domination harms the
oppressed and at the same time conceals the harm it causes. Alienation challenges learn-
ing processes more seriously. It demands high standards of critique that must be capable
of disclosing injustice, suffering, humiliation and disrespect. Domination, in other
words, entails ideological delusions. These are false beliefs and may also involve irra-
tional values. These values we would not espouse were we fully aware of why we hold
them, or were it not for certain psychological needs that press upon us and subject us to
special strains characteristic of those in our social role. So, my question is how Brun-
khorst could accommodate the relation between domination and alienation or ideology.
I know that, of course, he could, but I ask for more clarification on this issue.
I now will turn to my third question. Brunkhorst distinguishes 4 great legal revolu-
tions that established path-breaking normative constraints and implemented them consti-
tutionally. Each of these revolutions had the unplanned and contingent side effect of the
functional differentiation and self-referential closure of the 4 most important sub-
systems of modern society. First, the Papal Revolution in the 12th century had the effect
of the functional differentiation of the legal system. Second, the Protestant Revolution in
the 16th century had the side effect of the functional differentiation of the political sys-
tem. Third, the Constitutional Revolution of the 18th century had the side effect of the
functional differentiation of the economic system. Fourth, the Egalitarian Revolution
of the 20th century had the side effect of the functional differentiation of the global edu-
cational system. Along these lines Brunkhorst spells out his concept of the dialectic of
enlightenment according to which a new formation of freedom in a backstroke estab-
lishes new social class conflicts. First, the functional differentiation of the legal system
causes a structural social class conflict between the wielders of the normative power of
definition of true faith and the heretic associations of religious denomination. Second,
the functional differentiation of the political system causes a conflict between the
wielders of coercive power and the people. Third, the functional differentiation of the
economic system causes a class conflict between capital and labor. And finally, fourth,
the functional differentiation of the educational system causes a social class conflict
between the transnational establishment and the precariat.
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In a further move, Brunkhorst reconstructs 10 major features of all 4 cases of legal
revolutions. These features are identical components that are characteristic for the two-
fold process of emancipation and oppression. The components are the following ones:
first, a kind of ratchet effect at the epistemic core of the revolution; second, a class con-
test and the emergence of a new ruling class; third, a struggle for human rights; fourth,
the emergence of a new idea of freedom; fifth, one or more legal documents which mean
a new foundation of the society; sixth, a radicalization of modernity in the form of mod-
ernism; seventh, a respectively new formation of the co-evolution of cosmopolitan and
‘national’ statehood; eighth, a new system of constitutional law; ninth, a respectively fur-
ther move from transcendence to immanence; tenth, a specific dialectic of enlightenment
that is due to the formation of newly prevailing class interests and further steps in the
functional differentiation of modern society.
Last but not least, this is my third question or rather remark. It concerns the tenth fea-
ture, namely the specific dialectic of enlightenment. In my view Brunkhorst uses two dif-
ferent notions of dialectics: a weak notion of ambivalence and a strong notion of collapse
or catastrophe. The weak notion of ambivalence relates to the way that progress and
regression go hand in hand. Every progress is accompanied by new conflicts. Thus the
economic emancipation of individuals in the 18th century entails domination caused by
establishing property rights. This weaker notion of ambivalence does include a priority
of progression, while the stronger notion of dialectic does not. In the long run or from a
universal perspective the process of legal revolution described by Brunkhorst tends to
progression although without a final end. In contrast, the dialectic described by Adorno
and Horkheimer does not tend to any progress. For example, the regression to conflicts
caused by property rights is different from the harder case of regression to fascism. With
the moral catastrophe of fascism Adorno and Horkheimer, at least in my view, indicate
that the process of rationalization might be without any progression at all. In fact, my
third remark is not a question but rather a proposal that one should take into account this
distinction.
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